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Soviet Espionage Weakness

CPYRGHT

Allen W. Dulles' appraisal of the Soviet spy system points up an often-overlooked weakness in Communist espionage.

As the Central Intelligence Agency puts it, the Russian spy network is good at getting information but not so good at analyzing it.

This is to be expected. The Reds reap a big harvest of reports from Communist and party-line groups in all nations. Yet to use their information the Russians must evaluate it properly. They are unable to do so because, as Mr. Dulles explains, they don't know enough about the country from which it comes.

Such ignorance is not surprising. The Russian isolation from the rest of the world—their "Iron-Curtain" mentality—prevents a well-rounded view of other nations. Agents are tempted to submit only the facts their leaders want to hear, especially in political affairs. As a result such blunders as the Berlin blockade, seizure of

Czechoslovakia and the Korean War have forced free nations to unite and rearm.

Thus the Russian spy system is not by any means so efficient as it could be. However, this weakness is no cause for rejoicing: faulty Communist intelligence may cause a miscalculation which could lead to a world war. Peace will be best served if the Communists do not misinterpret—if they have a clear concept of what they can and cannot get away with.